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Abstract
The article is a review of Hauke Brunkhorst’s book on a Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions. The
author addresses three points: (1) Hauke Brunkhorst’s notion of history, and of what remains
unseen; (2) the dialectics of evolution and revolution, and whether the approach is sufficiently
dialectic, according to its own promise; and (3) the (too) implicit notion of critique.
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Hauke Brunkhorst has written a fascinating book, a magnum opus on how legal revolu-
tions have directed the inevitable social evolution of societies towards a more universal,
equality- and freedom-based world society. Both developments, according to Brunkhorst,
social evolution and (especially legal) revolutions, mutually influence one another. There
is not one without the other, even though there is always social evolution and only some-
times revolution. Revolutions are part of social evolution, just as genetic mutations are part
of natural evolution. Revolutions, and, with them, normative learning processes, steer
social evolution, the functional differentiation of society, in a certain direction, they gen-
erate ‘normative constraints’. Normative constraints function both as direction-givers and
as ratchet-effects that hinder – at least to a certain degree – the normative practices, once
established, from being overturned and forgotten. However, social evolution does not
exclude the extinction of existing conceptions, especially not in the course of a revolution.
The book, however, is not so much about forgetting existing conceptions, but about how
new ones come into the world.
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Brunkhorst follows Ju¨rgen Habermas’ early writings on ‘Legitimation Problems in
Late Capitalism’ and ‘On the Reconstruction of Historical Materialism’ when he argues
both with and against Marx that development and the creation of new concepts and prac-
tices in the sphere of social integration do stem from material reproduction, but not from
this alone. Rather, they have their own, independent logic. The social evolution of law
(and not so much of morality as in Habermas) is the key to understanding the various
forms of social integration.
In this very exciting and rich reconstruction of the triggering potential of legal revo-
lutions that reach from the 12th-century Papal Revolution to the 16th-century Protestant
Revolution over the so-called Atlantic Revolutions of the 18th century to the Egalitarian
20th-century Revolution, Brunkhorst depicts, in great detail, what the new notions of
freedom, of constitutional law, new kinds of social differentiation, new ways of class
struggle, forms of national and cosmopolitan statehood(s) and kinds of dialectics of
enlightenment(s) that have been formed throughout the fight between evolution and rev-
olution are, and how they manifested themselves.
This is far from being a boring story. To the contrary, the book is, in part, written like
a thriller; for example, the author depicts how the Calvinist lawyer Christopher Love
radically reinterpreted divine law and resorted to the ultimate authority of his con-
science, sola fide, which he paid for with his life after a London High Court of Justice
decision in 1651 (Brunkhorst, 2014: 166). But even a path-breaking book like this has
its flaws. Different aspects of the long path of this historical-systematic reconstruction
raise specific problems. I will concentrate on three points: (1) Hauke Brunkhorst’s notion
of history, and of what remains unseen; (2) the dialectics of evolution and revolution, and
whether the approach is sufficiently dialectic, according to its own promise; and (3) the
(too) implicit notion of critique.
I The notion of history
Brunkhorst’s notion of history can, perhaps, be best described as a conglomerate of a
Hegelian version and an evolutionary theory of history. With Hegel, Brunkhorst
embraces a notion of a dialectically achieved progress through negation, without, how-
ever, relying on an idea of objective spirit. Instead, progress, on the one hand, is impli-
citly directed towards a more differentiated, more universalist law, and the development
of an egalitarian and democratic society. On the other hand, progress is a result of impli-
cit critique and, finally, of outbursts of revolution. Immanent critique is enriched through
a Kantian notion of a ‘historical sign’ [Geschichtszeichen]. Hegel later formulated this in
terms of an idea of ‘existing concepts’, that is, a sign or a concept that exists not only in
science, but also for the social actors in daily practice (akin to equality), and which can
never be collectively forgotten. It ‘reminds’ people not only of what equality, freedom,
emancipation actually mean, but also what inequality, lack of freedom and suppressive
law look like. So, Hegel is one source of information. A second source of information
can be found in social theory, especially evolutionary theory of sociology, exemplified
earlier by Marx, Spencer, Dewey, Durkheim, Luhmann, and, to a certain extent, by
Habermas. Brunkhorst shares with Durkheim the assumption that evolutionary differen-
tiation started with the three components of the social life-world: culture; the person; and
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society. These elements of society are then differentiated into functional systems and
their environment(s).1 And, like Luhmann, he assumes that society consists not only
of social integration but also of mechanisms of functional stabilization. The take-off
of social evolution is caused by communication that rejects communicative propositions.
It is, first and foremost, a reciprocally observed double contingency that leads to the
functional differentiation, completely decoupled from the personal system, from recipro-
cal processes of understanding and referral to truth claims in language. For Brunkhorst,
both parts of social evolution, the dialectical and the functional, belong together.
Through this view, he combines critical theory with systems theory. Societal change,
he rightly thinks, needs both contradicting and stabilizing factors.
Both sources have an inherent notion of social progress. However, social progress is
no longer defined as an affirmative concept that is internally related to a substantial form
of life. Nor is social progress directed teleologically, as there is no such thing as an end of
history.2 Rather, it is a growth of systemic complexity, and there can be crises of produc-
tive and systemic growth that hinder a linear development of differentiation and learning
processes. The crises of complexities, and this is Brunkhorst’s important point, come
into focus through normative constraints that begin with the negative: the articulation
of a sense of injustice, of exclusion and of disrespect. These normative constraints are
part of evolutionary adaptation, too. They embody themselves in new constitutions and
new legal orders of society. Seen from this point of view, history is social evolution,
interrupted through normative changes of direction.
The advantages of this way of understanding history are obvious. What we obtain
from this approach is an explanation of the history of the changes of species, both human
and non-human, of changes in thinking and acting, of the development of productive
forces and the formation of society. We learn which historical processes have borne man-
kind, albeit with some backlashes and delays, towards a universalized world society, and
how. All this is not nothing. But there is at least one problem with this view.
Something remains hidden, invisible. And this is the precise conditions of these
developments and the condition of the very discourses about these processes. What is
meant by this may become clearer when we ask ourselves about what remains unan-
swered: What are the conditions of the singular appearances of events, of former or par-
allel discursive or non-discursive occurrences? Or, in other words: What is the structure
of the production of knowledge about these events? And how were alternative narrations
neglected, tranquillized, silenced? One can also put it in Habermasian terms: What are
the communication and action blockades that hinder alternative knowledge, public
debates, different interpretations and worldviews?
Let us take, for example, the struggles for human rights. From Olympe de Gouges up
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), from the early workers’ revolts to the current recognition of trade unions
in eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia, from the struggle for religious toleration
in the 17th century to the protests against discrimination on the grounds of skin colour
or national or religious affiliation today, from the resistance against despotism and the
murder of one’s ‘own’ people, to the camps in ‘extra-legal zones’: all of these struggles
exhibit an internal relationship between experiences of injustice and rights.3 But these
were not clear-cut, one-way developments.
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There were structural and power conditions that silenced experiences of injustice, that
covered up new readings of human rights such as Olympe de Gouges’ rights for women.
This was caused partly by a hegemonic, male discourse, both at that time and now. More-
over, it depended on a discourse of science that depicted women as non-reasonable
beings, more on the sentimental than on the rational side of life. And it was a discourse
of law which neglected gender equality, and was accessible only for wealthy white men
of the right religious background.
Or take the Haitian Revolution. The latest studies show that the Haitian Revolution is
not just a repetition of those in non-European regions.4 It does not fit into the overall nar-
ration of the Atlantic Revolutions. The Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) was the first
successful revolution of enslaved and colonized people. It stands as a beacon for anti-
colonial and anti-racist liberation movements throughout the world. But this remarkable
event has been silenced in former slaveholding nations and dismissed completely from
the canon of political theory. A reconstruction of the grammar of the Haitian Revolution,
as Buck-Morss or Ehrmann perform it, shows that one can situate it between the legal,
epistemic and economic order of the plantation and white masculine bourgeois republi-
canism.5 Silenced for a long time, the conception of freedom developed by the Haitian
revolutionaries constitutes a deconstruction of the dominant nexus of freedom, masculi-
nity, property and whiteness that underlies both the American and the French Revolu-
tions. It is the Haitian Revolution that offers a critique of central concepts of political
modernity and a rethinking of a radical universalism.
The important question – for my point here – is not so much that Brunkhorst’s recon-
struction is Eurocentric (this critique has been posed already6) but that a critical theory
approach would need to reveal both how and why alternative readings were cut off from
major discourses in the wake of power-relations and hegemonic ways of knowledge pro-
duction and communicative processes. Social evolution theory cannot offer this view. It
describes the ongoing development, but fails to explain why some readings have been
silenced while others became dominant. Nor can Hegel’s negation approach perform this
work completely. Revealing immanent contradictions through negation allows us to
declare that injustice has happened, but it does not offer any explanation or analyses
of how it happened. For this, one needs a discourse analysis that focuses on power and
knowledge production, an analysis of the obstacles to action and communication. This is
not possible without a social theory that allows for an in-depth analysis of how alterna-
tive readings of history were thrown out of the dominant historical narrations.
Why would this be important for Brunkhorst’s project? It would allow us to discover
why certain revolutions were successful and had a lasting effect on social evolution (such
as the Papal Revolution) while others were not, and why especially those revolutions that
were in the very interest of the oppressed (like the Haitian Revolution) tended so often
not to be successful and were neglected for ages by the political and academic commu-
nities. According to Walter Benjamin, the rise of any form of totalitarianism is a testi-
mony to a failed revolution. It refers to the fact that not only serious materialist and
political interests but also the needs of people were carelessly neglected. This is still true
today, in times of neo-liberalism where the danger of right-wing and religious funda-
mentalism is peering around every corner. But how was the revolutionary potential
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suppressed and why did hardly anybody notice it? This is the question a critical theory of
revolution needs to provide an answer to.
II Dialectics
This leads me to my second point and the question of whether Brunkhorst’s project is
sufficiently dialectical according to its own standards.
In the book, Brunkhorst distinguishes between the Kantian and theManagerial mind-
set. The Kantian mindset is described as the driving force towards individual autonomy
and public self-determination, as ongoing emancipation from existing law. The Manage-
rial mindset, in contradistinction, is based upon autonomous, professional experts who
implement and concretize legal work. This force adheres to present routines and struc-
tures. Whereas the first is the revolutionary push factor, the second is more the evolution-
ary ‘routine factor’. Cristina Lafont and others have already made the criticism that this
might be too dualistic a view. It is difficult, the critique goes, to locate historical events
‘squarely on either side of such a dichotomy. Whether social changes are gradual or
abrupt has nothing to do with whether they are either intentional or unintentional, blind
or norm guided and whether they can be evaluated from a normative or merely from a
functionalist perspective.’7 Brunkhorst has reacted to this critique. He admitted that
moral intentions are important as contributions to the variation pool of evolution and
gives an example: the abolition of slavery was possible only because the moral protest
against it engendered sufficient variation that made intentional and unintended legal
selection unavoidable. And it finally led to a re-establishing of slavery.8 But this is only
one part of the problem here.
A different problem seems to be that the Kantian mindset has its ‘problematical’ side
as well, just as the Managerial mindset has its ‘good’ sides. Both are dialectic in them-
selves. Both can create emancipatory and suppressive effects. Take the claim of univer-
sal ideas. More than once, universal ideas have stood and still stand for the legitimation
of colonization, for religious oppression, for disciplining human beings on grounds of
values and norms. A short glance at some scholarly critique on human rights may under-
pin this: Olympe de Gouges, to cite her again, sees in the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen an instrument of unwarranted male domination that contra-
dicts the principle of equal freedom to be found in the Declaration.9 For Marx, human
rights are civil rights that serve, in the first instance, to preserve the existing structure
of ownership of the bourgeoisie.10 Spivak claims that those who refer to human rights
always know in advance what is right and wrong, and this knowledge is just used to tell
others paternalistically what to do.11 And Alain Badiou argues that human rights obscure
the fact that barbarism and misery are political conditions that call for ‘a political prac-
tice-thinking’, and not ethical judgement that immediately defines who is the victim and
who is the perpetrator.12
These critiques shed light on the ambivalent side of universal principles and ideas.
They highlight the fact that an alleged emancipatory concept may produce, either as
an intended, or, more importantly here, as an unintended effect, its own opposite. Human
rights can be both emancipatory and repressive at the same time. And this is not so much
a question of wrong realization, or bad politics. Rather, it is concept-inherent. The
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conception of human rights bears its own negation. Similarly, the Managerial mindset
may lead to the implementation of legal rules which, in the end, help people to free them-
selves from oppression. Think about the juridification of a societal sphere of private life,
which, at some point, helped to condemn rape in marriage. Brunkhorst’s notion of dia-
lectics is between norms and principles, on the one hand, and functionalist differentia-
tion, on the other. The Kantian mindset bears the power of emancipation, whereas the
Managerial mindset bears the one of domination. However, the problem is more com-
plex, as dialectics runs through both elements of evolution. Clearly, both the Kantian and
the Managerial mindset can work in both directions. Dialectics, understood in the Hege-
lian or old critical theory notion, needs to bear dialectics in all kinds of societal processes
in mind. The concept of ‘Holocaust denial’ also exists, as a concept which, from the
point of view of the extreme right wing, contradicts the telling of a story which, they
maintain, is untrue.
III Critique
This leads me to my third point. When, one may now ask, can we speak of an ‘emanci-
patory’ potential of a certain practice, and when can we speak of an ‘oppressive’ one?
How does critique come into the picture in Brunkhorst’s book? Of course, one may say,
through the Hegelian notion of negation and the ‘existing concepts’. But how far does
this lead us?
Whereas idealist theory – as well as political liberalism – strengthens some notions of
justice, equality, or freedom, both critical social theory and Brunkhorst resort to the gen-
eralizing power of negation. It does not find its point of departure in the legitimation of
principles, but obtains it, instead, from a sense of injustice which appears through the
exploited classes, the suppressed peoples and the excluded parts of the population.13
Brunkhorst shows that Kant uses the reflexive dynamic of negation when he speaks of
the violation of rights that can be felt in every place on earth by everyone; Jean Piaget
identified the role of the experience of injustice for the development of a consciousness
of justice, and, one can add, Judith Shklar stresses the universality of a sense of injustice
for the formation of a just order.14 Negative feelings, as Adorno and later Habermas
claimed, have a cognitive content, which lies in their inter-subjectivity. When, as
Barrington Moore says, exploited workers or suppressed people bring about their rejec-
tion of suffering and oppression, then they proclaim something like ‘I can’t stand it
any longer!’ or ‘Workers of the world, unite!’15 They use the universalism of negation,
without which the theoretical knowledge of society would be impossible.16
But how far does this lead us, especially if we take the radical dialectics of the Kantian
and the Managerial mindsets seriously, which means that all developments have their
‘dark side’? I think that it is not enough simply to adhere to a notion of negation. We
need to have some ‘positive’ theory criteria that allow us to judge what counts as injus-
tice, as inequality, as exploitation, and what does not. Is it, for example, unjust to deny
human rights to great/big apes? Is it unjust to restrict immigration to Europe, even though
there are many protests in the streets against further immigration? Is it unjust to force
people receiving subsidies to work even though they are not responsible for their unem-
ployment, just because international rules demand such an economic regulation? There
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are many more hard questions like this that can be framed with a view to Brunkhorst’s
reconstruction of the 20th-century Egalitarian Revolution. What is important here is that
one needs normative criteria that help us to identify both what the emancipatory driving
forces and the oppressive ones are, and whether there were alternative narrations which
were neglected and oppressed but which can nonetheless be called emancipatory.
I would argue, with reference to Habermas, that the criteria for identifying are the bet-
ter argument. Or it could be a legitimized notion of equality or freedom, both of which
are conceptions that Brunkhorst uses in his book, as an anchor for his Kantian mindset
tale. Or one could also think about criteria that allow us to identify ‘colonization pro-
cesses’ on a global scale, by which Managerial mindset elements intrude into the realm
of the life-world with some pathological effects such as disintegration or alienation. Still,
just using conceptions such as equality and freedom does not mean ‘I have reached bed-
rock and my spade is turned’. One would like to hear more about how far his theory
allows us to distinguish good arguments from bad ones in the wake of dialectics of social
evolution and revolution. Why, to come back to the second paragraph of my article, is the
‘Holocaust denial’ not a normative constraint (of course, it is a normative constraint)
which is emancipatory (which, of course, it is not). It is this question that Brunkhorst’s
work on evolution and revolution does not yet have an answer for.
Notes
Many thanks to Cristina Lafont for organizing a workshop on Hauke Brunkhorst’s books at North-
western University in February 2015 and giving me the chance to discuss this article at that occa-
sion. Moreover, I would also like to thank Hauke Brunkhorst for giving me the opportunity to
discuss with him not just the whole manuscript but also earlier versions of it for some years now.
Many doubts are gone, vanished in the long discussions and through the force of the better argu-
ment, I guess. But still, I am not fully convinced yet.
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